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REFLECTIONS ON UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN 
FUTURO: 
SHAVERS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AND 
ROBINSON V. CAHILL 
The venerated doctrine that unconstitutional statutes are void ab 
initio has long ceased to hold sway in this country. Factors such as 
administrative problems and detrimental reliance have led courts 
to hold statutes unconstitutional prospectively from the date of the 
opinion. 1 
More recently, the rise in public law litigation has led to further 
judicial innovations in developing remedies which affect major 
societal institutions. 2 This article will discuss a judicial holding 
used recently by two state supreme courts which delays a statute's 
unconstitutionality to some date in the future beyond the date of 
the opinion. This holding, referred to as "unconstitutionality in 
futuro," has three distinct features: delayed effectiveness of the 
holding of unconstitutionality to some date beyond the date of the 
opinion, a set of suggested guidelines provided by the court for the 
benefit of the legislature or the executive which will, if followed, 
save the statute from being voided at a future date, and the reten-
tion of jurisdiction over the case by the court. 
While unconstitutionality in futuro provides an effective means 
of judicial control over the response of the legislature or executive 
to actions of the judiciary, the doctrine raises serious concerns 
about the proper role of the judiciary. First, unconstitutionality in 
futuro may adversely affect judicial legitimacy, which is essential 
to the strength of the courts as an independent branch of govern-
ment. Second, courts may lack the necessary competence to deal 
successfully with the ongoing problems present in litigation which 
addresses broad public issues, and may use unconstitutionality in 
futuro without first testing it against firmjudicial standards. Third, 
since the court's remedy in a holding of unconstitutionality in fu-
turo is dependent upon actions of the other branches of govern-
ment, the long-term remedies may fail to provide relief for the par-
ties. Finally, holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro must be re-
• See notes 12-15 and accompanying text infra. 
• The problems presented to courts by public law litigation and the need for innovative 
judicial treatment of cases are not confined to the federal level. The jurisprudential issues 
confront both federal and state courts. Most of the discussion, however, is drawn from 
federal cases because that is where the focus of most commentators' analyses lie. 
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conciled with the separation of powers doctrine which restrains 
one governmental branch from exercising the powers of another 
branch. 
In discussing these issues, this article will argue that holdings of 
unconstitutionality in futuro are difficult to reconcile with the sep-
aration of powers doctrine because they foster impermissible intru-
sions on the ability of the legislative and executive branches to act 
indepenqen tly of the judiciary. It is further argued that in the two 
cases where courts have adopted the unconstitutionality in futuro 
approach, the failure to satisfy all of the proposed standards for the 
appropriateness of unconstitutionality in futuro and the further 
considerations of judicial legitimacy and competency should have 
led the courts to consider other less drastic alternatives before de-
ciding to use unconstitutionality in futuro. 
I. PuBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND INNOVATIVE JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
A. Development of Prospective and Prospective-Prospective 
Holdings 
Traditionally, civil adjudication has been primarily a process of 
resolving private disputes having immediate impact solely on the 
parties directly involved. 3 Courts today, however, are frequently 
confronted with complex litigation involving broad public issues 
which affect others than the parties involved in the suit. Such litiga-
tion demands of judges great sensitivity to the rights and duties of 
the parties before the court and also to the far-reaching ramifica-
tions which these cases will have for unrepresented parties and the 
public in general. A leading commentator has described suits with 
these characteristics as "public law litigation. " 4 
3 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285 
(1976). The traditional private litigation model is bipolar: the parties and interests are 
diametrically opposed, and only one can be the winner. The immediate consequences of 
prevailing in the action accrue solely to the parties to the suit. An example of the private 
litigation model is the simple contract case in which one party is awarded damages or 
specific performance by the court. 
4 Id. at 1284. Under this model, it is recognized that the litigation has far-reaching ef-
fects which are not confined to the persons on the other side of the traditional bipolar 
structure. The following features are characteristic of the public law litigation model: 1) 
the scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily by the courts and 
parties, as is demonstrated in the liberalization of formal pleadings; 2) the party structure 
is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous, as shown in the relaxation of joinder 
rules; 3) the factual inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and legislative; 
4) relief is not compensatory for past wrong, but forward-looking and fashioned ad hoc 
along flexible lines; 5) the remedy is not imposed but negotiated; 6) the decree does not 
terminate judicial involvement - its administration requires the court's continued in-
volvement; 7) the judge takes an active part in negotiating the remedy rather than remain-
ing a neutral arbiter; 8) the subject matter is not a dispute between private individuals but 
a grievance about the operation of public policy. Id. at 1302. 
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In public law litigation the relationship between the relative 
rights of the parties, the holding of a case, and the remedy provided 
is changed. Under the traditional civil litigation model, right and 
remedy are interdependent. The scope of the remedial relief flows 
from the substantive legal violation on the theory that compensa-
t~on is measured by the harm caused by the breach of duty. 5 Under 
the public law litigation model, right and remedy are separated. 
The remedy does not follow logically from a finding of a substan-
tive violation but rather is decided in light of the circumstances in 
each case. The remedy is not a final transfer of money or services 
but instead is often a program which takes into account future con-
sequences and other interests.6 
Therefore, since public law litigation cases often cannot properly 
be settled by traditional remedies such as money damages, and 
often involve major institutional adjustments, courts have more 
frequently employed novel and quasi-legislative remedies. As a re-
sult, the role of judges has shifted from being that of primarily dis-
interested arbiters of private disputes to that of public policy-
makers and enforcers. 7 
The advent of public law litigation has demanded of judges a flex-
ibility in their treatment of cases in which the common law has 
been overruled or statutes declered unconstitutional. 8 With one 
exception, 9 unconstitutional statutes or common law doctrines 
which have been overruled have traditionally been held void ab in-
itio~ 10 As such, the holdings in these cases have been given re-
5 Id. at 1282-83. 
6 Id. at 1293-94. 
7 Id. at 1286, 1302. 
8 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text infra. 
9 Decisions overruling prior state statutory interpretations affecting obligations on a 
contract are not given retroactive effect. Such a holding would contravene the Contract 
Clause of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any law 
"impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. See, e.g., United 
States Trust ofN. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. I. See, e.g., United 
and New Jersey entered into a contractual agreement in 1962 concerning bonds issued by 
· the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Both states passed legislation, effective 
in 1973, which made the 1962 agreement inapplicable. The Court held that the New Jersey 
law violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But see Home Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The Court upheld the validity of the Minnesota 
Mortgage Moratorium Act, reasoning that an emergency situation justifies the passage of 
state legislation which modifies or abrogates contracts already in effect. 
• 0 The void ab initio theory states that if a statute is unconstitutional now, it must have 
been unconstitutional at its enactment and therefore was never a law. See Note, 
Prospective-Prospective Ove"uling, 51 MINN. L. REv. 79, 79-80 & n.3 (1966). For an ex-
ample of a void ab initio holding, see Stanton v. Lloyd Hammond Produce Farms, 400 
Mich. 135, 253 N.W.2d 114 (1977). The Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs 
injuries had been sustained during the course of his employment. The injuries occurred 
before the statutory exclusion of agricultural workers from wage benefit coverage was de-
clared unconstitutional, but they occurred after the injuries to the plaintiffs in the case in 
which the statutory exclusion was declared unconstitutional. The court decided, there-
fore, that its ruling would apply retroactively and the statute would be void from the date 
of its enactment. 
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troactive effect. 1 1 Today courts have universally displaced re-
troactive holdings with prospective holdings in situations where 
parties have relied on a statute or precedent, or where a retroactive 
holding would be unduly harsh or burdensome. 12 The constitu-
tional validity of prospective holdings of unconstitutionality has 
been firmly established. 13 Prospective holdings may apply pros-
pectively to the cases in which they are announced, 14 or they may 
be applicable not to the cases in which they are announced but to 
every case arising thereafter. 1 5 
At the federal level, prospective holdings have become particu-
larly common in the area of criminal procedure. 16 They are also 
11 A "retroactive" or "retrospective" rule of law relates back to transactions which 
occurred before it came into force. See Chicago,·1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 
(1913); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886); Horrigan v. Klock, 27 Mich. App. 
107, 183 N.W.2d 386 (1970); Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 379 
Mich. 160, 150 N. W .2d 752 (1967). For a brief treatment of the reasons for retroactive ap-
plication of rules of law, see Note, Prospective-Prospective Ove"uling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 
79, 79-80 (1966). 
12 See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 111.2d II, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), 
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (where the court abolished the rule of sovereign immun-
ity from tort suits with respect to school districts, the court may restrict the application of 
the new rule to the instant case and to cases arising in the future, where retroactive appli-
cation will result in hardship to t1lose who have relied upon prior decisions of the court). 
See also Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. I, 
7-16 (1960); Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional 
or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1947). 
13 Prospectivity was established as an alternative to retroactivity in the landmark deci-
sion, Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Certiorari 
was granted to the Supreme Court of Montana to review a judgment affirming a lower 
court decision in favor of the plaintiff in an action to recover payments alleged to be an 
overcharge for freight. The Court affirmed, rejecting the defendant's argument that the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution was infringed by the prospective 
effect given its decision. Id. at 364. Finding that the Federal Constitution is silent on the 
matter, the Court held that a state, in defining the limits of adherence to precedent, may 
choose between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. Id. See 
also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), where the 
Court rejected the principle of absolute retroactive invalidity. The Court reasoned that the 
effect of the subsequent ruling as to a statute's invalidity should be considered in a num-
ber of aspects, with respect to particular individual and corporate relations and particular 
private and official conduct. "Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of 
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, or 
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and its previous application, 
demand examination." Id. at 374. 
14 See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 111.2d II, 163 N.E.2d 89 
(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960). 
10 See, e.g., Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, Ill N.W.2d I (1961). Plaintiff-
executrix brought a wrongful death action against the city alleging that negligence caused 
ker husband to fall down an elevator shaft. The court denied recovery to the plaintiff on 
the grounds of city immunity from suit, but stated that from that day forward, the doctrine 
of governmental immunity from tort suit was abrogated. 
16 See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), establishing that the dedsion 
whether to give a ruling of unconstitutionality retroactive or prospective effect should de-
pend on the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule. Id. at 629. In criminal 
procedure, the purpose is not to free properly convicted criminals, which retroactive ap-
plication of the new rule would tend to do, but instead to curb illegal police practices. Id. 
at 637. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that an accused pris-
oner had the right to be apprised of all of his rights before interrogation. The Court did 
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common in civil cases, 17 especially in areas of important and en-
during human interest, such as school desegregation, 18 school aid 
tax programs, 19 and voter reapportionment cases. 20 
At least three state supreme courts, in deciding cases with a sig-
nificant public impact, have introduced a variation on the principle 
of prospective holdings, delaying the application of the new judicial 
rule beyond the date of its announcement. 21 This judicial approach 
not, however, apply this rule to cases brought before the date of the Miranda decision. 
Law enforcement agencies were thereby warned that they would have to modify their in-
terrogation procedures. Prospectivity, however, is not the absolute rule in criminal pro-
cedure cases. For an appraisal of the prospectivity-retroactivity problem in this area, see 
Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, Forward: The High Coun, The Great Writ, and 
the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); cf. Schwartz, Retroaciiv-
ity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 719 
(1966). 
17 See notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra. 
18 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1295. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown[), 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). In this case, the Court declared that racial segregation in public schools 
violates equal protection principles, but it did not immediately issue a decree. Instead, the 
Court requested additional information from the parties to help it formulate an appropri-
ate decree. One year later, in Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 
the Court decreed that programs of public school desegregation should be implemented 
"with all deliberate speed." Id. at 301. In stating that the compliance should occur with all 
deliberate speed, the Court recognized that changes in such a large area could only take 
/ place slowly: See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971); 
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In these cases the Court refined its 
Brown II remedy and required remedies which would cure the effects of past violations as 
well as present violations. Each of these remedies was effective prospectively. 
19 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), aff g, 348 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The 
Court held that where the district court, pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court, 
restrained payments to church-related schools, where the parties who had claimed the sta-
tute was unconstitutional had not sought interim injunctive relief, and where the church-
related schools had relied on the forthcoming funds, the funds allocated to reimburse the 
schools for services rendered in the interim period could be paid. Thus, where the schools 
demonstrated reliance, the holding that the payments were unconstitutional was not al-
lowed to have retroactive effect. 
20 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), in which the Court held: I) it is a basic con-
stitutional requirement that seats in both houses of the Alabama legislature be appor-
tioned on a population basis and 2) deviations are permissible so long as they are based on 
legitimate considerations of the effectiveness of a rational state policy. In adopting the 
"one man-one vote" principle, the Court affirmed a district court order calling for a 
temporary reapportionment of the Alabama legislature for the 1962 election and enjoining 
officials from holding future elections under what the court had previously decided were 
invalid proposed plans. See note 132 and accompanying textinfra. 
21 Spane) v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); 
Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Holytz v. City of Mil-
waukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N. W .2d 618 (1962). For a discussion of these three cases, see 
note 23 infra. 
A recent twist on this judicial approach occurred in Whitney v. City of Worcester, 77 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 366 N .E.2d 1210 (1977). In this case, the plaintiff's suit against the 
City of Worcester for negligence had been dismissed below on the basis of the doctrine of 
municipal tort immunity. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced th·at if 
the Massachusetts legislature refused to enact legislation on the subject of municipal tort 
immunity before the adjournment of the 1978 legislative session, the court would abrogate 
the doctrine in the first case arising thereafter. Id. at 1715, 366 N.E.2d at 1212. The court 
further said that if it was forced by legislative inaction to abrogate the doctrine, the over-
ruling would be retroactive to any claim arising after May 13, 1973. Id. at 1735, 366 N.E.2d 
at 1220. The court remanded to the trial court pending legislative or judicial action. Id. at 
1736, 366 N .E.2d at 1220. For a critical response to Whitney which makes manY. of the 
same points regarding this approach, and which labels it prospective-retroactive overrul-
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has been labeled "prospective-prospective overruling. " 22 To date, 
it has not been used in cases where a statute has been held uncon-
stitutional but rather when a common law or judicially-created rule 
embodying an established public policy determination has been ab-
rogated.23 The rationale for prospective-prospective overruling lies 
in an argument of fairness: if it is unfair to impose a new rule oflaw 
retroactively on persons who have relied on prior law, then it 
would be equally unfair to apply the new rule immediately without 
affording a period for adjustment and adaptation.24 In extending 
the principle of prospectivity in this manner, courts have recog-
nized that widespread changes in public behavior occur slowly. 
B. Elements of Unconstitutionality In Futuro: 
Shavers and Robinson 
Recently, two state supreme courts have gone one step beyond 
prospective-prospective overruling by holding a statutory scheme 
unconstitutional in futuro. 25 An unconstitutional in futuro holding 
ing, see Comment, Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding Cases Pending 
l,egislative Determination of Law, 58 B.U.L. REV. 818 (1978). 
22 Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 80 (1966). 
23See, e.g., Spane! v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,264 Minn. 279, ll8 N.W.2d 
795 (1962) (the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defense of sovereign immunity 
would no longer be available to school districts and other governmental subdivisions with 
respect to torts committed after the adjournment of the next session of the Minnesota 
legislature); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (in a suit seek-
ing damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident, the Missouri Su-
preme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability is abrogated 
prospectively as to all claims arising on or after August 15, 1978, which was almost a full 
year after the issuance of the opinion); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 
N .W.2d 618 (1962) (the court found that the doctrine of governmental immunity, being it-
self judicially created, may be changed or abrogated by judicial decision, reasoning that to 
enable the various public bodies to make the necessary financial arrangements, the effec-
tive date of the abolition of immunity would be approximately six weeks after the issuance 
of the opinion, but the decision would nonetheless apply to the case at bar). 
24 See Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 82-91 (1966), for 
a concise discussion of the background to prospective-prospective overruling and the 
theoreticaljustifications for it. See also Grant, The Legal Effect of a Ruling that a Statute 
is Unconstitutional, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 201 (1978). The author examines the legislative 
approaches of several countries toward the consequence of each country's highest court 
ruling that a statute is unconstitutional. For example, the Austrian Constitution of 1920 
provided that a statute which is ruled unconstitutional is automatically annulled. But the 
constitutional provision was qualified to recognize the legislative nature of the court's 
role in annulling the statute, so that it could delay the annulment up to a full year. Id. at 
217. This practice is analogous to a court's use of discretion in prospective-prospective 
overrulings. 
25 Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N. W.2d 72 (1978); Robinson v. 
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). "Unconstitutionality 
in futuro" is the phrase used by Justice Ryan in referring to the majority's holding in 
Shavers, 402 Mich. at 656,267 N.W.2d at 714 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Catherine Shavers 
and four other similarly situated plaintiffs brought an action for a declaratory judgment 
against the Attorney General, the Secretary of the State of Michigan, the Commissioner of 
Insurance, and several insurance companies challenging the constitutionality of the 
Michigan No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-
.3179 (West Supp. 1978-79). The Michigan Supreme Court held: 1) the No-Fault Act is 
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delays the effect of a finding that a particular statute or provision is 
unconstitutional until sometime after the issuance of the court's 
opinion.26 In this regard, unconstitutionality in futuro is similar to 
prospective-prospective overruling, but there are significant dif-
ferences. A prospective-prospective holding merely provides 
notice that the law will be changed in a particular manner sometime 
after the date of the opinion.27 Unconstitutionality in futuro has in-
cluded, in both cases in which it has been used, court-fashioned 
programs which the legislature or executive is advised to adopt by 
a certain date, on pain of the statute being invalidated as uncon-
stitutional .28 Furthermore, the courts have retained jurisdiction in 
order to oversee compliance with remedial orders and to resolve 
any problems which might arise. 29 Therefore, the phrase "uncon-
constitutional to the extent that it provides insurance benefits to victims of motor vehicle 
accidents without regard to fault as a ·substitute for tort remedies, which are partially 
abolished, and that the Act constitutionally accomplishes this goal; 2) the Act's property 
damage protection scheme reasonably relates to the valid public purposes of creating an 
incentive to build safer cars, encouraging group rates, and reducing costs by eliminating 
the necessity for fault investigation, and 3) while the Act is, theoretically, a valid rational 
response to problems affecting the general welfare, the actual mechanisms for protecting 
the welfare of individual Michigan motorists who are required by law to purchase No-
Fault insurance are constitutionally deficient in failing to provide due process. Id. at 579-
80, 267 N. W .2d at 114. See a /so notes 39-45 and accompanying text infra. The court de-
clared the No-Fault Act unconstitutional, but stated that the ruling would not be effective 
until 18 months from the issuance of the opinion. 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court held an educational financing 
scheme unconstitutional, the holding to become effective sometime in the future. See 
notes 35-42 and accompanying text infra. 
26 While in Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978), the 
period of delay is both specific and lengthy (18 months), this feature is unusual in cases in 
which the existing statute or rule is not voided immediately. Compare· Shavers with 
Spane! v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N .W.2d 795 (1962), and 
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown/), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Spane/, discussed in note 23 
supra, the period of delay was approximately 5 months. 1963 Minn. Sess. Laws Serv. 
(West). Brown I held that state action involved in segregated public schools violates the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the massive adjust-
ment necessitated by the decision, the Court in Brown II framed its remedy in terms of an 
equitable injunction calling for compliance "with all deliberate speed," which enabled the 
Court to put its new ruling into effect slowly. See also In re Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 
N.W.2d 473 (1964), in which the Minnesota court held Totten trust assets subject to the 
forced share of the surviving spouse, but made this a prospective-prospective ruling. In 
this case, -the court was even less specific than in Spane/ as to the time which should 
elapse before the new rule would take effect: "We would prefer the Restatement rule 
.... However, in view of the widespread use of Totten trusts we do not feel free to adopt 
the Restatement rule without first giving the legislature an opportunity to provide for it by 
statute .... "Id. at 195, 130 N. W.2d at 481. There was thus no specification at all of when 
the ruling would be effective. 
21 See note 23 supra. 
28 See Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 607-08, 267 N .W.2d 72, 91 (1978); 
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson/), 62 N.J. 473, 519-20, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (1973). 
29 Some cases of prospective overruling feature suggested guidelines and retention of 
jurisdiction. For example, in Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown/), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the 
Court retained jurisdiction and asked for further information and reargument on the issue 
of an appropriate remedy. In Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown//), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the 
function of the delayed implementation of the Court's decree, which was a type of pros-
pective holding, is slightly different from the function of delayed unconstitutionality in a 
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stitutionality in futuro" refers to all holdings simultaneously 
exhibiting these three distinguishing features: the postponement of 
the effect of the holding, the inclusion of suggested guidelines for 
future legislative or executive action, and the retention of jurisdic-
tion by the court. The coexistence of these three features distin-
guishes unconstitutionality in futuro from prospective and 
prospective-prospective holdings.30 
The most recent example of a court's use of unconstitutionality 
in futuro is Shavers v. Attorney General.31 In an action for a de-
claratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the Michi-
gan No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, the Michigan Supreme 
Court held that the measures provided to assure that compulsory 
No-Fault insurance would be available to motorists at fair and 
equitable rates are inadequate and in violation of state due process 
principles. The court held the act defective for the following rea-
sons: 1) the statutory protection against "excessive, inadequate, or 
unfairly discriminatory'' rates was without the support of clarifying 
rules established by the Commissioner of Insurance, without a 
legislatively sufficient definition, and without any history of prior 
court interpretation, so that the legislative mandate was thus re-
duced to "mere exhortation;" 32 2) there were inadequate statutory 
holding of unconstitutionality in futuro. The function of the Brown II decree was primarily 
a practical one: to allow individual public school boards time to devise their own 
strategies for compliance which could not have been devised overnight. On the other 
hand, the function of the delayed unconstitutionality in a holding of unconstitutionality in 
futuro is not only to give the legislature or executive time to devise remedies of their own 
but to provide an impetus for adopting the court-suggested guidelines. If the legislature or 
executive fails to act, the responsibility for any further judicial action rests not with the 
court but with the branch that has failed to act. 
30 Of these three distinguishing features, only the timing aspect is present in 
prospective-prospective overruling. There is usually no need for the court to retain juris-
diction and no reason to suggest guidelines for future action in a case where the common 
law or a judicial rule has been abrogated. However, as in/n re Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 
N .W.2d 473 (1964), a court may suggest that the legislature enact legislation to replace an 
abrogated common law rule. The public must in most circumstances simply prepare for 
and live with the new rule. 
31 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). 
32 Id. at 602, 267 N. W.2d at 88. The section of the Insurance Code dealing with rates 
charged to insureds states, inter alia: "(I) All rates shall be made in accordance with the 
following provisions: ... (d) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
criminatory." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 500.2403(1) (West Supp. 1978-79). The section 
further states: 
(I) Every insurer authorized to write and writing automobile bodily injury liabil-
ity and property damage liability insurance in this state shall participate in an or-
ganization for the purpose of: (a) Providing the guarantee that automobile insur-
ance coverage will be available to any person who is unable to procure such in-
surance through ordinary methods. (b) Preserving to the public the benefits of 
price competition by encouraging maximum use of the normal private insurance 
system. (2) The organization created under this chapter shall be called the 
"Michigan automobile insurance placement facility." 
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3301(1) (West Supp. 1978-79). Standing alone, this section 
is procedurally vague. But Justice Ryan in his dissent notes that the "various underwrit-
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provisions available to a motorist to attack the validity of an indi-
vidual rating decision: 33 and 3) there was no adequate statutory 
provision permitting an individual to challenge insurance refusal, 
discriminatory cancellation, or assignment to the "Automobile 
Placement Facility" with its presumptively higher rates .34 
The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitu-
tional status of the Michigan No-Fault Act put it in "an extraordi-
nary jurisprudential position:" the Act was held constitutional in 
its general thrust, but unconstitutionally deficient in its administra-
tive mechanisms. 35 The court went on to say that it believed it 
necessary for "the purposes of general jurisprudence, the general 
welfare of the public and the administration of justice" to hold that 
the Act would remain in effect for eighteen months from the is-
suance of its opinion.36 Furthermore, the court set out minimum 
standards which the No-Fault Act must meet in order to pass con-
stitutional muster.37 The Michigan legislature was invited by the 
court to implement these standards to save the Act. While it is true 
ing guidelines currently employed by state-regulated casualty insurers are not alleged to 
be arbitrary or discriminatory either by the majority or by the plaintiffs on appeal." 402 
Mich. at 652 n.10, 267 N.W.2d 112 (Ryan, J., dissenting). · 
33 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 500.2406 (West Supp. 1978-79) (filings and support-
ing data for such rating decisions which have been submitted by insurers are open for pub-
lic inspection only after filing becomes effective). 
34 402 Mich. at 603-04, 267 N.W.2d at 89. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 500.3365. 
(West Supp. 1978-79). The "Automobile Placement Facility" is a legislatively-created 
facility for those motorists who have been refused insurance coverage by private insurers, 
or who are unable to obtain it for any reason. The court states that a motorist who is 
placed in the Automobile Placement Facility "is subject to a statutory presumption that 
the rates charged will be higher than the rates for motorists in the open marketplace." 402 
Mich. at 604, 267 N.W.2d at 89. 
35 402 Mich. at 608-09, 267 N.W.2d at 91-92. 
36 Id. at 608-09, 267 N.W.2d at 91-92. 
37 Id. at 607-08, 267 N.W.2d at 91. The court stated that no-fault insurance does not 
satisfy minimum constitutional due process requirements unless: 
I. The Legislature and/or the Commissioner of Insurance (pursuant to his pre-
sent rule-making authority, MCL 500.2484; MSA 24.12484), give substantial 
meaning to the statutory standards "Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or 
unfairly discriminatory" ... 
2. A filed rate, or a rate determined on administrative or judicial review, pro-
vides and sets forth: 
a) premiums reasonable to insured and insurer for the specific insurance 
coverage without regard to factors assertedly warranting differences in pre-
miums among those insured; 
b) the factors which properly may be considered by the insurer in dif-
ferentiating premiums among those insured, and; 
c) the amount of differential appropriate for each such factor. 
3. Such information for each insurer is publicized in such a manner that every 
person affected can readily ascertain the factors and amounts of differentials ap-
plicable to him and calculate the premium the insurer may charge. 
4. Every motorist has the opportunity to obtain a prompt and effective ad-
ministrative review of an insurer's calculation of the factors, differentials and 
premium applicable to him and a prompt and effective administrative review of 
the basis for the refusal or cancellation of insurance. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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that the list of minimum standards did not constitute a court-
ordered program which the legislature was obliged to follow, it was 
nonetheless a powerful signal to the legislature of what the court 
would find acceptable to cure the due process infringement. Fin-
ally, the court stated that "at an appropriate time before eighteen 
months from the issuance of [the] opinion, [it would] re-examine 
the constitutional status of the No-Fault Act in terms of remedying 
the present due process deficiencies. " 38 At that time, an appropri-
ate order reflecting the Act's constitutional status will be entered. 
As precedent for its holding, the Michigan Supreme Court cited 
only one case, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1). 39 In Robinson I, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state's educational 
financing scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to "furnish 
[a] thorough and efficient system of public schools .... " 40 It 
suggested that if the state desired to delegate the task of ac-
complishing its obligation to maintain and support a thorough and 
efficient system of free public schools, it must do so through a plan 
which would fulfill its continuing obligation. 41 More specifically, 
the state had to define adequately what that obligation was and 
compel local school districts to raise enough money to meet the ob-
""id.at 609-10, 267 N.W.2d at 92. 
39 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) [hereinafter, refer-
ences to the entire Robinson controversy will be to Robinson and references to the par-
ticular case before the court will be enumerated Robinson I - Robinson VI]. In this case, 
action was brought by residents, taxpayers, and various municipal officials challenging 
the constitutionality of the system of financing public schools in New Jersey. In handing 
down its decision that the New Jersey educational tax scheme was unconstitutional, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court suggested guidelines, which, if adopted, would ensure the 
enactment of a constitutional scheme; it delayed the effect of its holding until the end of 
the current school year, and retained jurisdiction in order to monitor compliance with its 
decree. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's first brush with Robinson did not dispose of the con-
troversy, but marked the beginning of a lengthy period of administrative headaches for the 
court. During the next three years the case returned five times to the court, and each time 
the court delayed rendering a final decision by issuing provisional orders and holding that 
the existing statutory scheme should remain in force for the next school year. See Shavers 
v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 609 n.33, 267 N. W.2d 72, 92(1978), and id. at 670 n.5, 
267 N.W.2d at 120 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). See also Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case 
Study In Judicial Self-Legitimation, 8 RuT.-CAMD. L.J. 508-25 (1977), which criticizes the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's issuance of the initial injunction and its subsequent handling 
of the case, stating that the first opinion has the "appearance of a judicial fiat [and that] 
(e]xacerbating this perception is the realization that 'the same small group of persons 
[were] responsible for making the initial determination of unconstitutionality now invoked 
as the compelling reason for a further assertion of power.' "Id. at 518 (footnote omitted). 
In finally disposing of the case, the court in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 
358 A.2d 457 (1976), issued an injunction which froze spending for public schools after the 
court in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson///), 67 N .J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975) had mandated 
an application of provisional remedies. These became unnecessary in light of the legisla-
ture's enactment of the Public School Education Act of 1975. The court later held that this 
Act facially met the requirements of an efficient system. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 
69 N .J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). 
40 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson/), 62 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 294 (1973). 
41 id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297. 
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ligation.42 Noting, however, that education must continue and that 
a period of adaptation was needed for the New Jersey legislature to 
enact another statute, the court stated that financial obligations 
thereafter incurred by state taxpayers pursuant to the existing sta-
tutes pertaining to education financing would be valid in accord-
ance with the terms of the statutes.43 The court then requested the 
further views of the parties and additional argument as to the rem-
edies which should be provided. After hearing further argument, 
the court issued a per curiam opinion, of substantially the same 
form as the Shavers holding, stating that the court would not dis-
turb the statutory scheme if legislation compatible with the court's 
decision was enacted by December 31, 1974, effective no later than 
July 1, 1975.44 The court then retained jurisdiction to ensure com-
pliance.45 
Although Shavers and Robinson are presently the only cases 
upon which the efficacy of the unconstitutionality in futuro holding 
can be judged, together they provide clear examples of some of the 
practical and theoretical difficulties inherent in such holdings. 
Among the practical difficulties are the necessity of judicial super-
vision, which requires large expenditures of time and energy on a 
single case and the necessity of temporary solutions decided upon 
without legislative or administrative assistance, where such assis-
tance would be desirable. These practicalities have perhaps taken 
the courts beyond the bounds of constitutional mandates and judi-
cial competence. Among the concerns raised by the courts' use of 
this approach are the reconciliation of the unconstitutionality in 
futuro concept with the separation of powers doctrine and the need 
for the court to maintain its legitimacy. Furthermore, there is the 
jurisprudential problem that in issuing a holding of unconstitution-
ality in futuro, a court may fail to give definite relief to either of the 
parties by making the relief conditional on the response of a non-
party, the legislature, or the executive. These considerations 
should effectively limit the court's use of unconstitutionality in fu-
turo as a remedy .46 
42 Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297. 
43 Id. at 520-21, 303 A.2d at 298. 
44 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson JI), 63 N.J. 196,198,306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973) (The perti-
nent part of this case is cited in Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. at 609 n.33, .267 
N.W.2d at 92). 
4s Id. 
46 "Remedy" here refers to the type of relief which is granted in the public law litigation 
sphere. It is complex and ongoing, and may be negotiated with help from the parties and 
with the judge's participation. It is not necessarily final, but may instead be temporary. 
Because the declared rights of the parties do not necessarily dictate the form of relief in 
public law litigation, courts have great leeway in deciding the form which the relief should 
take. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra. · 
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II. LIMITS ON THE USE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN FUTURO 
A. Judicial Legitimacy 
The judiciary must possess and be perceived by the public as 
possessing legitimacy if it is to operate as one of the three distinct 
and equally powerful branches of government. It has been said that 
legitimacy attaches to actions of courts only when they perform the 
functions assigned to them in the manner assigned .47 
A court will be accorded legitimacy if it stays within the bounds 
of its functions and if it displays competence in performing those 
functions. Thus, the concept of judicial legitimacy is strongly 
linked to the concepts of judicial function and judicial competence. 
The ultimate effectiveness of a court's decision depends on the wil-
lingness of society to comply with the decision because it is viewed 
as a legitimate exercise of the court's power. Societal compliance 
depends in the end upon approval and consensus.48 
47 A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 104-05 
(1976). Professor ·cox eloquently discusses the importance of legitimacy to the United 
States Supreme Court: 
The power of the Supreme Court to command acceptance and support not only 
for its decisions but also•for its role in government seems to depend upon a suffi. 
ciently widespread conviction that it is acting legitimately, that is, performing the 
functions assigned to it, and only those functions, in the manner assigned. The 
conviction of which I speak is the resultant of many voices, not all carrying equal 
weight: of the opinion of the legal profession, of attitudes in the Executive and in 
Congress, of the response in State governments, of the press, and of public opin-
ion. 
48 Id. at 117-18. Professor Cox puts the matter thusly: 
Constitutional adjudication depends, I think, upon a delicate, symbiotic rela-
tionship. The Court must know us better than we know ourselves. Its opinions 
may ... be the voice of the spirit, reminding us of our better selves.In such cases 
the Court ... provides a stimulus and quickens moral education. But while the 
opinions of the Court can help to shape our national understanding of ourselves, 
the roots of its decisions must already be in the nation. The aspirations voiced by 
the Court must be those the community is willing not only to avow but in the end 
to live by. For the power of the great constitutional decisions rests upon the ac-
curacy of the Court's perception of this kind of common will and upon the 
Court's ability, by expressing its perception, ultimately to command a consen-
sus. 
See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 20 (1962). But see L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978). Professor Tribe states: 
Most of the worry about how far judges may go, however genuine it may be and 
however fashionable it is again becoming, strikes me as rote unreality, pro-
foundly misconceived in light of the inevitable social and cultural constraints on 
judicial intention and impact .... The inescapable boundaries of societal con-
text and consciousness argue not that judges should restrain themselves still 
further, but that they must raise distinctive voices of principle. Though I express 
occasional reservations about judicial initiative in specific settings, I reject the 
assumptions characteristic of Justices like Felix Frankfurter and scholars like 
Alexander Bickel: the highest mission of the Supreme Court, in my view, is not 
to conserve judicial credibility, but in the Constitution's own phrase, "to form a 
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Traditional representative democratic theory holds that legiti-
macy of judicial action derives from a delegation of power to the 
courts from the elected representatives of the people and that 
courts should therefore carry out the legislative will. On this 
theory, judicial review is countermajoritarian - by invoking the 
doctrine of judicial review to hold individual statutes or statutory 
schemes unconstitutional, courts act counter to the popular will as 
it is expressed in legislation.49 But it is also generally accepted that 
there are some areas in which a majority should not control merely 
because it is the majority .50 The judicial branch, and in particular 
the United States Supreme Court, has been given the power to de-
fine both majority and minority freedom through the interpretation 
of the Constitution.51 In order to perform this task of defining the 
respective areas of freedom well, the judiciary must derive and be 
perceived as deriving its answers from the Constitution rather than 
imposing its own value choices .52 
Both public and professional expectations of judicial neutrality 
play an important role in our legal tradition and are an important 
more perfect Union" between right and rights within that charter's necessarily 
evolutionary design. 
49 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1314. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 48, at 16. It must be 
noted, however, that in theory the popular will is also embodied in the United States Con-
stitution and various state constitutions, and that co11rts therefore act in accord with the 
"popular will" when they determine whether a given statute is constitutional. 
so Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,2-3 
(1971). Bork writes: 
If the judiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society 
is not democratic. The anomaly is dissipated, however, by the model of govern-
ment embodied in the structure of the Constitution, a model ... we may for con-
venience ... call "Madisonian." 
A Madisonian system is not completely democratic, if by "democratic" we 
mean completely majoritarian. It assumes that in wide areas of life majorities are 
entitled to rule for no better reason than they are majorities .... The model has 
also a countermajoritarian premise, however, for it assumes there are some areas 
of life a majority should not control .... These are areas properly left to indi-
vidual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects of life is tyranny. 
51 Id. at 2. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated concerning judicial review: 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitu-
tion apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case con-
formably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the con-
stitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflict-
ing rules governs the case. This is the very essence of judicial duty. 
52 Bork, supra note 50, at 3. Bork writes concerning the power of the Supreme Court to 
define both majority and minority freedom through the interpretation of the Constitution: 
[I]t follows that the Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demon-
strate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitu-
tion, of the respective spheres of majority and minority freedom. If it does not 
have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or worse if it pre-
tends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilections, the Court vio-
lates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifies its power. It then 
necessarily abets the tyranny either of the majority or of the minority. 
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source of the judiciary' s prestige and legitimacy. 53 In private law 
litigation, the judiciary's function is to be a neutral arbiter. 54 The 
judiciary's unique neutral function is highlighted when contrasted 
with the functions of the other branches. The other branches are 
assumed to respond to pressure or to interests which are some-
times highly organized. 55 Courts, on the other hand, render 
"legitimate" decisions only when they are perceived as seeking to 
disassociate themselves from individual or group interests and ad-
judicate by disinterested standards. Legitimacy derives from a 
realization that decisions are reached not because of some personal 
bias on the part of the judge but because they are consistent with 
principles which apply to all citizens at all times. 56 
Unconstitutionality in futuro poses a threat to the legitimacy of 
the judicial branch. Its three distinctive features may signal to the 
legislative or executive branch that the court finds fault with its 
work, and that the court is willing and able to replace the statutory 
scheme with a better one of its own creation. First, this approach 
suggests that the court is operating beyond the scope of an impar-
tial arbiter, and is in fact performing a legislative function. Under 
the traditional view, the judicial function con sis ts essentially in the 
investigation, declaration, and enforcement of liabilities under 
existing laws. In contrast, the legislative function is forward-
looking and alters existing conditions by making policy judgments 
wnich are applied prospectively .57 Unconstitutionality in futuro is 
used in public law litigation, where the line between judicial and 
legislative functions is not clear or rigid. Nonetheless, if a court 
through a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro seeks to weigh 
and balance the same interests which the legislature has already 
considered, or to urge its own solution on the legislature, its per-
ceived neutrality is impaired.58 
Second, the court must run the risk that it will in fact fail to im-
plement a better program while becoming enmeshed in remedial 
problems. If it fails, a further loss of legitimacy may result. This 
53 M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1964). 
54 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1283. 
55 For a classic and critical account of the roles interest groups play in the political arena, 
see C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1964). 
56 A. Cox, supra note 47, at 108-09. 
57 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). Mr. Justice Holmes ex-
plained: 
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on 
present or past facts and under Jaws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose 
and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing 
conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of 
those subject to its power. 
58 Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 575, 
582-84 (1967). 
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loss may occur because the court is inattentive to contemporary 
currents of thought in society and seeks by its decisions either to 
hasten the process of societal change or to retard the growth of an 
attitude which it disfavors. The court may simply be incompetent 
to make complex policy decisions within the litigation 
framework. 59 
The risks are illustrated by both Shavers and Robinson. If the 
legislature fails to act after Shavers, the No-Fault Act could be de-
clared void as of January, 1980, and motorists would revert to rem-
edies under traditional negligence and tort laws, which would 
create chaos in the insurance field. 60 
A more likely judicial response is the issuance of a temporary 
remedy similar to the one issued in Robinson /. 61 The initial tem-
porary remedy in Robinson I, which stated that obligations thereaf-
ter incurred under the existing statutes would be valid according to 
the terms of those statutes, marked the beginning of three years of 
administrative problems with the New Jersey education financing 
scheme. 62 Temporary remedies such as those provided in Robin-
son I aggravate the court's involvement in the remedial process. As 
provisional remedies they require a response from the affected par-
ties, and will be altered by the court depending on the nature of the 
parties' response. The court's follow-up remedy could range from 
59 In Justice Mountain's dissent in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 164, 
358 A.2d 457, 461-62 (1976), he identifies one frequently raised limitation on the judiciary's 
ability: 
Finally, removing a matter from legislative or executive control may often re-
sult in most unfortunate side effects. The Court may often be unable to view the 
governmental problem in its entirety and as a whole. For instance, in the case 
before us the obvious effort of the Court is to compel the raising of a very large 
amount of money and seeing that it is allocated to educational needs. Worthy as 
is this purpose, it takes no account of any number of public needs of which the 
Legislature is acutely aware. Welfare, public health, needed renovation and con-
struction of public facilities including correctional institutions, mass transit and 
essential increases in the wages and salaries of public employees, to name but a 
few, are also very worthy purposes .... If the judiciary seeks satisfactorily to 
resolve the problem before it, may not compelling needs be forced to go unmet? 
The Legislature can, as it customarily does, take account of all public obliga-
tions, and allocate funds accordingly. 
• 0 The important point is not that a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro runs a 
greater risk of producing chaos than other types of holdings, such as prospective holdings. 
Rather, it is that courts should not think that they will always be avoiding chaos by simply 
employing a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro. 
61 The possibility that the 18 month deadline would be extended and that the Michigan 
Supreme Court would refuse to carry out its present plan to void the No-Fault Act if the 
Michigan Legislature does not respond satisfactorily was discussed by Chief Justice 
Coleman in a television appearance in March, 1979. Coleman stated that a principal criter-
ion in deciding whether to extend the limit would be how close the leislature is to enacting 
a remedial measure, but said, "I wouldn't want to go on record saying the court will do 
something in a certain situation.'' 18 Michigan Report no.47, at I (Gongwer News Service, 
Inc., March 9, 1979) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
62 See notes 39-45 and accompanying text supra. 
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finding the parties' response adequate for correcting the deficiency 
in the statute to involving the court in the development of an en-
tirely new set of guidelines. Adaptation of this course would in-
volve the Shavers court deeply in the remedial aspects of the case 
with no guarantee that the remedial process will do more than 
create protracted litigation as in the Robinson cases. 63 
Third, by outlining an acceptable response from the legislature 
or the executive, the court is resting its legitimacy on a response 
from a separate branch of the government which may not be forth-
coming. Thus, a key question which any court that is contemplat-
ing use of an in futuro holding ought to consider is whether its 
mandate will impel the legislature or the executive to appropriate 
action. In Shavers, for instance, the Michigan legislature might re-
fuse to act in accordance with the court's directives, because it is 
deadlocked over the provisions which would remedy the No-Fault 
Act, or because the eighteen-month period proves to be too 
short. 64 The court should also be aware of a possible collision be-
tween itself and the legislative or executive branch if, subsequent 
to the court's formulation of a temporary remedy, the other 
branches act on their own and adopt different programs. 65 At the 
very least, the court would be embarrassed by the public's ten-
dency to view the legislative or the executive branch as the rightful 
source of policy and administrative decisions. 
Fourth, there is an inherent danger that a court may undermine 
its legitimacy by avoiding its decision-making responsibilities when 
it issues a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro. Once a statute or 
statutory scheme has been declared unconstitutional in futuro, the 
court shifts the responsibility to the legislature or the executive to 
act or to demur. The court is no longer seen by itself and by others 
as responsible for whether the statute is in fact voided. Ironically, 
as the Robinson cases suggest, the legislature, in tum, may not 
consider itself the proper dicision-maker. 
A court may also be avoiding its fundamental responsibility of 
ruling on the legal issues in cases which come before it. Paradoxi-
cally, by holding a statute unconstitutional in futuro, a court exer-
cises its traditional judicial function in validating and legitimizing 
the use of an existing statutory scheme while simultaneously ren-
dering an opinion regarding the statute's constitutionality. Argu-
63 See note 39 supra for a discussion of the Robinson litigation. 
64 While 18 months may seem like an adequate period, it may be that the legislature, 
knowing it unnecessary to act immediately, will indefinitely delay consideration of reme-
dial legislation. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. 
65 See A. Cox, supra note 47, at 94-96. Professor Cox generally discusses the proper 
function of the Supreme Court within the government, and emphasizes the importance of 
each branch remaining within the bounds of its proper role. 
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ably, by declaring a statute unconstitutional and delaying the effect 
of that holding a court is upholding an unconstitutional statute. 66 In 
theory a statute or statutory scheme which has been held uncon-
stitutional remains void until it is either remedied or replaced. 67 
This, however, was not the Shavers court's intention, since it 
stated, "[a]t an appropriate time before 18 months from the is-
suance of this opinion, we will reexamine the constitutional status 
of the No-Fault Act in terms of remedying the present due process 
deficiencies. " 68 This language indicates that the statute will not be 
unconstitutional until the court actually voids it at the end of the 
eighteen-month period. Under this alternative interpretation, the 
Shavers court's action constitutes a legal fiction which is ajudicial 
attempt to sidestep the command of Marbury v. Madison 69 that 
courts review the legality of cases which come before them, includ-
ing the constitutionality of the applicable statute. 
Finally, because the legislative and administrative adjustments 
to the holdings are made easier by delaying the effect of the holding 
and by maintaining the status quo during the interim period, a court 
may more hastily conclude that a statute or statutory scheme is un-
constitutional than if it could not delay the effect of its holding. As 
a result, more statutes or statutory schemes which are defective in 
ways which do not amount to traditionally conceived constitutional 
deficiencies may be held unconstitutional in futuro on the theory 
that this is· an effective means of ensuring that the defect will be 
removed, and that there is correspondingly little risk that the court 
will have to void the statute. 70 
66 In Shavers, the court issued interim directives which included the requirement that 
until the legislature or appropriate agency responds to the deficiencies, the Commissioner 
is to enforce the present regulatory scheme in the spirit of the court's opinion to assure the 
availability of no-fault insurance at fair and equitable rates. Shavers v. Attorney General, 
402 Mich. at 610-11, 267 N.W.2d at 92-93. 
61 See Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96 (Mun.Ct.App. D.C. 1952) (The underlying principle 
is that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unen-
forceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished, and that if the decision 
is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date). See also Magnolia Petroleum 
Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 218 F.2~ I (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955) (by 
implication) (an unconstitutional statute may be amended into a constitutional one so far 
as its future operation is concerned by removing its objectionable provisions, or by sup-
plying others, to conform it to the requirements.of the Constitution). 
68 Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. at 609-10, 267 N.W.2d at 92. 
69 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
70 This observation is supported by recent events in the field of administrative law. 
There has been at least some recognition by members of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare of a relaxation in judicial attitudes toward faulty agency regulations. 
HEW Memorandum from Galen Powers to Peter Libassi and Bob Derzon (March 23, 
1978) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). The author states that, in the area of 
rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the judiciary is 
increasingly willing to give agencies an opportunity to correct APA violations while allow-
ing the rule to remain in effect pending substitution of a properly promulgated rule. See 
Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Schupak v. 
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B. Judicial Competence 
1. Ability to Provide a Remedy-Under the traditional model of 
private law litigation, the remedy flows more or less directly from 
the nature of the violation; 71 relief is given directly to the parties 
and the impact of the judgment is confined to them. 72 In contrast, 
one of the main features of public law litigation is the increasing 
importance of equitable relief that may have consequences for per-
sons not before the court. One test of the court's competency in 
handling public law litigation is its ability to formulate a satisfac-
tory program which will work for the parties presently as well as in 
the future. 73 
In holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro, there is no certainty 
that either party to the lawsuit will obtain relief. Because of the de-
layed effectiveness - and, thus, conditional nature - of the hold-
ing, the plaintiffs may never get the relief they sought and to which 
the court holds that they are entitled. A comparison of Shavers and 
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown Il)7 4 illustrates this point. 
Even though the Brown II Court did not begin to penalize the 
school districts for noncompliance immediately upon the issuance 
of its opinion, it is clear that if subsequently confronted with a 
comparable case, the Court would have held that the system vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
and would have fashioned appropriate relief. Thus, for purposes of 
the remedy given to the parties to the lawsuit, the system was un-
constitutional as of the day of the opinion. It is not so clear, on the 
other hand, how the Michigan Supreme Court would rule if another 
case like Shavers came before it within the eighteen-month interim 
period. The court refers to its holding that the No-Fault Act is un-
constitutional on due process grounds for failing to provide 
adequate administrative remedies as something which it has done. 
This indicates that the No-Fault Act is presently unconstitutional, 
Mathews, No. 76-2016 (D.C. Cir., filed Nov. 7, 1977); American Health Care Ass'n v. 
Califano, 443 F. Supp. 612 (D.D.C. 1977); Humana of S.C., Inc. v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 
253 (D.D.C. 1976). 
The approach taken by the federal district courts and courts of appeals in these cases is 
roughly analogous to the Michigan Supreme Court's approach in permitting the No-Fault 
Act to remain effective during the 18 month interim period. An important difference, how-
ever, is the fact that in these federal cases, no statute has been declared unconstitutional 
and therefore it cannot be argued that the federal courts have encroached on the province 
of the legislature. Nonetheless, while no legislative action is required to correct the prob-
lems in Radway, Humana of S.C., Inc., Schupak, or American Health Care Ass' n, execu-
tive action is required. 
71 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1282-83. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra. 
72 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1283. 
73 See id. at 1298-1301. 
74 349 u .s. 294 (1955). 
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at least as to its procedural provisions. 75 Even though the statute in 
Shavers has been declared unconstitutional, the court ruled that 
the Commissioner of Insurance should continue to apply the sta-
tute under pre-Shavers law. This is at best a pyrrhic victory for the 
plaintiffs in Shavers, who succeeded in having the statutory 
scheme they were attacking declared unconstitutional, only to be 
told by the court that relief, in the form of voiding the statute, 
would be withheld. More generally, there is the danger that future 
plaintiffs will also fail to receive immediate relief if they bring suit 
prior to the court's final determination of the constitutionality of 
the statute. 
One commentator,76 in analyzing recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions, identified three additional concerns with regard to 
judicial competence: the lack of judicial standards for prospective 
choices in complex policy matters; a court's competence to deal 
with large amounts of technical data; and a judge's ability to super-
vise and administer long-term decrees in a manner consistent with 
his traditional role as an aloof arbiter. 77 These concerns and their 
75 Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. at 611,267 N.W.2d at 93. The court stated: 
Although we have held the No-Fault Act's "compulsory insurance require-
ment" unconstitutional because of insufficient due process protections, effective 
as of 18 months from the issuance of this opinion, we again emphasize our con-
current holding that "[d]uring the interim period ... the No-Fault Act's constitu-
tionally valid provisions, as decided in this opinion and subsequent opinions, will 
remain in effect. 
76 Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 
HARV. C1v. R. - C.L.L. REv. 1 (1978). 
11 Id. at 43-44. Goldstein analyzes Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), in which the 
Supreme Court declined to enforce a lower court order which reorganized the school dis-
tricts of an entire metropolitan area and disregarded boundary lines between school dis-
tricts, pursuant to an order to desegregate. At stake in this case was a metropolitan plan 
for bussing pupils from predominantly black schools to white schools, and pupils from 
predominantly white schools to black schools. The plan included not only the Detroit 
school district but also outlying suburban school districts, even though it had not been 
shown by any statistical data that there were implicit plans to maintain a certain ratio of 
white to black students. The Court stated that where interdistrict relief was ordered to 
remedy a constitutional violation occurring in several districts, boundary lines between 
those districts could be ignored. Otherwise, these lines could not be casually ignored or 
treated as administrative conveniences because local control over schools is a deeply 
rooted tradition and is thought to be essential to the maintenance of the quality of the edu-
cational system. 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974). 
Goldstein argues that, in so holding, the Milliken Court stressed the following aspect of 
judicial competence: it criticized the district court's attempt to create a metropolitan 
school district because it required the court to engage in making technical, bureaucratic, 
and financial decisions. Goldstein also notes that courts are considered no more compe-
tent to act as day-to-day administrators engaging in on-going supervision than as policy-
makers, that they are institutions designed "to act occasionally and on principle but not to 
respond on a continuing basis to newly arising practical problems." Goldstein, supra note 
70, at 44-45 (footnote omitted). Perhaps the most recent expression of this concern by the 
Court is found in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Court held that a federal agency's decision to 
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implications for unconstitutionality in futuro warrant considera-
tion. 
2. Proposed Judicial Standards-The potential lack of judicial 
standards is a problem in every vari~ty of public law litigation. 
Even in abrogating old tort remedies or state immunity from suit, 
various state courts have had to replace old rules with new ones 
which are equally without firm judicial standards. 78 But uncon-
stitutionality in futuro is particularly liable to abuse where no firm 
judicial standards exist because it is conducive to deepened court 
involvement with and control over litigation which is extremely 
important to society. With no judicial standards to guide it, a court 
employing unconstitutionality in futuro may substitute guidelines 
or a temporary scheme arbitrary and unresponsive to the public 
policy or political considerations underlying the original scheme. 
In light of this admitted problem, it is helpful to consider a possi-
ble set of standards for deciding when a court should employ un-
constitutionality in future. The standards proposed for guiding 
courts in using prospective holdings also offer a basis for judging 
the appropriate use of unconstitutionality in futuro. 79 
The first standard is whether there has been a clear demonstra-
tion that precedent must be overruled or a statutory scheme de-
clared unconstitutional. A clear demonstration requires that there 
be no other viable alternatives available to the court exceptjudicial 
overruling or declaring the entire statute unconstitutional. In Shav-
ers, the court found the No-Fault Act procedurally deficient, while 
holding that the No-Fault Act, insofar as it provides benefits to vic-
tims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to fault, constitu-
tionally accomplishes its goal.80 Given this unique constitutional 
grant the plaintiff corporation a license to build a nuclear reactor would not be overturned 
simply on the grounds that the rule-making procedures adopted by the agency were in-
adequate, which they were not in this case. The Court, through Justice Rehnquist, stated 
that the Administrative Procedure Act, at 5 U .S.C. § 553 (1976), establishes the maximum 
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have courts impose on federal 
agencies in conducting rule-making proceedings, and that while agencies are free to grant 
additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, reviewing courts are gener-
ally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them. Id. at 524. The 
Court nonetheless recognized that this is not an absolute rule: "This is not to say neces-
sarily that there are no circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning 
agency action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the 
statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare." Id. 
78 Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 80 (1966). See notes 
21-23 supra. 
79 See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicia I Responsibil-
ity, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533,561 (1977). 
80 402 Mich. at 579,267 N.W.2d at 77. 
The court also stated: 
The constitutional status of the No-Fault Act places this Court in an extraordi-
nary jurisprudential position: the No-Fault Act, which has substantially affected 
every Michigan motorist, every insurance company underwriting motor vehicle 
insurance in Michigan, and our entire system of civiljustice for nearly five years, 
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situation, an altemat.ive available to the court would have been to 
read the due process requirements into the statute.81 This would 
not require the court to hold the entire statute unconstitutional in 
futuro and to risk voiding both the constitutionally sound and con-
stitutionally infirm portions of the statute. Arguably, then, Shavers 
does not satisfy the first standard. 
Robinson, on the other hand, seems more clearly to have met the 
requirement of the first standard. In light of the New Jersey Con-
stitution's mandate to the legislature to provide for the mainten-
ance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public 
schools, the Robinson court decided that the 1970 Act which pro-
vided for school aid on the basis of local taxation and "weighted 
pupils" did not satisfy the state's constitutional obligation. 82 There 
is no other way that the Robinson court could have accomplished 
its purpose of assuring a thorough and efficient system of free pub-
lic schools except by striking down the entire 1970 Act as uncon-
stitutional. The fault lay with the entire Act, not simply its pro-
cedural provisions. While Robinson may satisfy this standard, 
however, it arguably raises significant separation of powers prob-
lems.83 
One alternative to holding a statute unconstitutional in futuro, 
which was not available in either Shavers or Robinson because the 
statutory schemes had been challenged by plaintiffs alleging harm, 
is for the court to issue an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions 
have been given in Michigan84 and also in New Jersey. 85 Advisory 
opinions issued in response to legislative action leave to the legisla-
ture the process of making the underlying political and policy deci-
sions and minimize the courts' intrusion into these decisions. In 
rendering advisory opinions, courts simply perform the traditional 
judicial function of determining the constitutionality of a statute. 
Thus, where a court may issue an advisory opinion, it is preferable 
to holding a statute or statutory scheme unconstitutional in futuro. 
While the advisory opinion accomplishes the important end of 
warning of the constitutional infirmity of a statute or statutory 
scheme, it neither demands the compliance of another branch nor 
so clearly risks the disruption of the statutory scheme at a definite 
future date. 
is constitutional in its ge'neral thrust but unconstitutionally deficient in its 
mechanisms for assuring that compulsory no-fault insurance is available to 
Michigan motorists at fair and equitable rates. 
Id. at 581, 267 N.W.2d at 78. 
81 See note 120 and accompanying text infra. 
82 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson/), 62 N.J. at 515-19, 303 A.2d at 295-97. 
83 See Part II C infra. 
84 See Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1974 P.A. 242, 394 Mich. 41, 228 
N.W.2d n2 (1975). 
85 See, e.g., In re Public Utility Bd., 83 N.J.L. 303, 84 A.706 (1912). 
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The second standard is whether the new rule or set of guidelines 
is thought to be the best of all possible replacements. In most 
cases, this will amount to a less drastic means test, which would 
require the court to choose guidelines which are constitutionally 
sound but will disrupt the administration of a statutory scheme to a 
lesser degree than any other constitutionally sound guidelines. In 
these cases, the best possible replacement is that which causes the 
least possible disruption. The minimum due process guidelines 
which the Shavers court issued may be assumed to meet the sec-
ond standard because of the court's undoubted competence to 
fashion constitutionally sound due process standards and because 
the guidelines were accompanied by an interim order to apply all of 
the present provisions of the No-Fault Act until the legislature 
acted to adopt those guidelines or until the eighteen-month period 
passes. Thus, if the legislature responds appropriately, there will 
be a minimum of disruption in the administration of the No-Fault 
Act. 
Whether the Robinson court's desired changes and suggested 
guidelines satisfy the second standard as the best of all possible re-
placements is unclear. The court's yearly appropriations of educa-
tional funds together with its statement that the state, in order to 
impose a statewide property tax, must tax all taxable property in 
the state, or if assigned to local governments, the tax must fall uni-
formly upon all taxable property within the county or municipal-
ity ,86 failed to produce a satisfactory response for three years. In 
fact, instead of producing the least possible disruption of public 
education in New Jersey, the Robinson court's suggested 
guidelines and yearly appropriations finally resulted in the court's 
issuing an injunction against all spending for public education.87 
Even though the educational tax scheme had to be declared uncon-
stitutional, the court could have minimized the disruption to the 
system through use of an alternative similar to that used in Shav-
ers. Specifically, the court could have allowed the existing stat-
utory scheme to remain in effect until the legislature acted rather 
than appropriating funds itself on a yearly basis and unilaterally al-
tering the appropriations formula. 88 The second standard should 
also include a determination by a court that its use of unconstitu-
tionality in futuro will appreciably increase the chance that it will 
not in the end have to institute its own drastic remedy. The practi-
cal problem with this suggestion, however, is that it is difficult for 
86 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288. 
87 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). 
BB See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson III), 67 N.J. 333, 350-51, 339 A.2d 193, 201-02. 
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any court to foresee whether legislative compliance with the 
court's suggested guidelines is probable. The subsequent history of 
Robinson indicates that courts should not lightly assume that legis-
latures will be as anxious as they are to avoid disruption. 
The third standard is whether the hardship on the group which 
has relied on the present rule or present statutory scheme out-
weighs the hardship on the party denied the benefit of the new rule 
or set of guidelines. Hardship should refer to both disruption of a 
social practice or institution and the injustice which is done as a 
result of maintaining the status quo until a determined time in the 
future compared with the injustice done by immediately instituting 
the new rule. The third standard thus requires courts to balance the 
relative social costs of abrupt or delayed implementation of a 
change which they have decided must take place. 
The balancing required by the third standard limits unconstitu-
tionality in futuro to cases in the public law litigation area which 
challenge pervasive social programs. Both Shavers and Robinson 
seem to satisfy the third standard. The hardship on motorists and 
injured victims which would be created by voiding the No-Fault 
Act as of the date of the opinion far outweighs the hardship on the 
plaintiffs who are denied the benefit of new minimum due process 
provisions. Likewise, the heavy reliance by the parties on the 
existing educational tax scheme in New Jersey far outweighs the 
benefits to be gained by ordering an immediate statutory shift. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from the application of these 
three standards. The balancing test in the third standard will al-
ways favor the use of unconstitutionality in futuro so long as it is 
limited to challenges of broad social programs. The first two stan-
dards, however, limit the use of unconstitutionality in futuro within 
the public law litigation area. These sanction its use only when 
other alternatives are not available. When no other alternatives 
exist, the less drastic means test requires that a court select 
guidelines which will disrupt the program as little as possible. This 
will, in most cases, require that the statutory scheme remain in ef-
fect until the legislature acts. Together, these standards outline a 
program of judicial restraint in the use of unconstitutionality in fu-
turo. They minimize the intrusion of the courts into the legislative 
and administrative processes and so protect the courts' legitimacy 
by keeping them within the bounds of their competence. The 
standards also implicitly recognize the fact that all courts wili more 
frequently be confronted with litigation requiring them to fashion 
remedies responsive to interests beyond those of the parties di-
rectly involved in the suit. 
3. Lack of Technical Expertise----The necessity of digesting the 
large amount of technical data present in complex public law litiga-
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tion conflicts necessarily with the time constraints placed on any 
lawsuit. Judges have neither the time nor the resources to make 
in-depth sociological or statistical studies to help them reach a de-
cision. Thus, there are time limits to the court's ability to make and 
implement policy decisions within the framework of litigation. 89 By 
the use of unconstitutionality in futuro, courts guarantee a deep 
and time-consuming involvement with complex and technical is-
sues and with the critical evaluation of various legislative or execu-
tive attempts to remedy the statute or statutory scheme. As the 
Robinson cases demonstrate, one legislative attempt to remedy a 
statute or statutory scheme and one critical evaluation by the court 
may not be sufficient.90 
In addition to the time constraints which work against any court 
involved in complex litigation and contemplating the use of a hold-
ing of unconstitutionality in futuro, courts also lack adequate 
information-gathering apparata.91 Unlike legislatures, which have 
comparably more time to act on a given proposal and greater ac-
cess to needed information through specialized committees and 
legislative staffs, courts have traditionally been at the mercy of the 
parties for fact and issue development,92 and have not had the re-
sources or personnel at their disposal for an elaborate analysis of 
inforrnation.93 The lack of information-gathering apparata and the 
presence of time constraints have led courts to regard a single case 
as an adequate representative of all cases in the area. Courts may 
thus be tempted to treat a case as representative when the entire 
thrust of the case is to the contrary.94 
To some extent, legislatures are faced with the same problem: 
89 D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLJCY 298 (1977). Horowitz states the 
problem informatively: 
It may be the limited scope of consultation, or the inability of courts to see how 
their policies work out, or the difficulty of dealing with unusually fluid or broad 
problems in an episodic and narrow framework, that stamps the judicial process 
as more limited for some policy problems than other institutions are. 
90 See note 39 and accompanying text supra. 
91 See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 89, at 277-78. Horowitz considers the reliance which 
the Supreme Court placed on empirical aids in formulating its opinion in Miranda, noting 
that the decision has been criticized by police officers because it relied too heavily on 
information contained in police manuals advocating extreme interrogation practices. 
Horowitz states that the Court inferred the existence of a widespread practice on the basis 
of advice given by the manuals, and as a result treated that issue in a vulnerable and unin-
formed fashion. Id. He concludes that sources of judicial information can affect both the 
soundness of a decision and its legitimacy and impact: "A decision out of touch with the 
reality familiar to the specialized functionaries affected by the decision may inspire 
resistance rather than respect." Id. at 278. 
92 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1283. 
93 See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 89, at 279. 
94 Goldstein, supra note 76, at 45-46. 
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the input they recei-ve can be as unrepresentative of a given area as 
a case may be. The difference is that legislators have control over 
the weight given input from certain interest groups, while courts 
are usually more dependent on the parties to the lawsuits before 
them for determining the scope of issues presented .95 
4. Administrative Shortcomings-The nature of the traditional 
role of the courts in fashioning remedies tends to render courts in-
competent to deal with on-going situations which demand flexible 
plans and day-to-day attention to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion. When it issues a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro, a 
court retains jurisdiction and frequently reviews the situation. This 
automatically involves the court in the day-to-day operation of ac-
tivities for which it has no formal training and little knowledge, tak-
ing it beyond the bounds of its competence and taxing its legiti-
macy in the eyes of the public.96 
Competence encompasses much more than familiarity with the 
subject matter of a statute or social program, such as the Michigan 
Supreme Court had with the No-Fault Act. It includes having ac-
cess to a wide range of informational resources, a willingness and 
capacity to deal with far-reaching problems outside the narrow and 
episodic framework of the traditional case, and the tools to insure 
that the court-fashioned policies will be put into practice.97 
Courts which employ holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro 
must be prepared for long-term administration and frequent re-
95 /d. at 45-47. This dependency is mitigated to some degree by the use of amicus curiae 
briefs and court-appointed masters. 
96 Use of the equitable decree enables a court to be involved in "a complex, on-going 
regime of performance rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer," and it prolongs 
rather than terminates the court's role in the subject matter of the litigation. Chayes, 
supra note 3, at 1298. See generally Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Jud-
icial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. I (1957), where the authors state: 
The point is that the courts will draw from a body of experience not germane to 
the problem they will face. Given their limited means of informing themselves 
and the episodic nature of their efforts to do so, they will only dimly perceive the 
situations on which they impose their order. Even if they do perceive, they will 
necessarily come too late with a pound of "remedy" where the smaller measure 
of prevention was needed. Their rules, tailored to the last bit of trouble, will 
never catch up with the next and different dispute. They will allow or forbid and 
be wrong in either event, because continuous, pragmatic, and flexible regulation 
alone can help. They will on most occasions naturally shy away from basing their 
judgments on what they are accustomed to regard as "political" factors incom-
patible with their disinterestedness, although these may form the only sensible 
context of questions before them. And they will thus find themselves resting 
judgment on trivia or irrelevancies. All this wi II not only, by its sheer volume, 
divert the energies of the courts from their proper sphere but will also tend to 
bring the judicial process into disrepute by exposing it as inadequate to a task 
with which it should never have been entrusted_. 
fd. at 25. 
97 See note 89 and accompanying text supra. 
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views of the process of compliance.98 In most cases, they will lack 
the capacity, tools, time, and therefore the competence to do an 
effective job as an administrator. Even in such fundamental areas 
as school desegregation99 and school financing,1 °0 - areas in 
which the courts have had substantial experience - courts have 
not had the anticipated success in administering the remedies they 
have mandated because the necessary degree of compliance from 
legislatures and administrative agencies has not been forthcom-
ing.1 °1 There is no reason to believe, in the light of the Shavers and 
Robinson cases, that holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro will 
induce greater or more immediate compliance than will prospective 
holdings. This lack of willing compliance, if it continues for a long 
period or is within a highly visible public concern, will tend to 
exacerbate a court's loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
Any court which contemplates employing a holding of unconstitu-
tionality in futuro should be alerted to the fact that its holding will 
be carefully scrutinized not only for its immediate effects but also 
for the court's ability to secure future compliance. 
C. Separation of Powers 
1. Nature of the Doctrine-The separation of powers doctrine is 
closely allied with the concerns of judicial legitimacy and compe-
tency. It will serve to limit a court's decision to implement a pro-
gram after holding a statute unconstitutional in futuro. 
The federal version of this doctrine generally forbids the courts 
from interfering with the operations of the other two branches by 
trying to correct defects in statutes or by replacing statutes with 
rules of their own. 102 Many state constitutions contain a clause 
98 This statement also holds true for rulings which are applied prospectively. 
99 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971); Green v. 
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown[), 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
100 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson[), 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 976 (1973). 
101 For an interesting account of one court's attempt to administer changes which it had 
ordered in a state's mental institutions, see Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a 
Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). 
102 Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1970), rehearing denied, 402 U.S. 990 (1970) 
(the Court is not constitutionally empowered to overturn a state's legislative choice under 
the guise of constitutional interpretation because the Justices believe they can provide 
better rules); Winningham v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 371 F. Supp. 
ll40 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff d, 512 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1975) (Article III of the Constitution 
does not confer the power on federal courts to correct the shortcomings and asperities of 
statutes by what amounts to judicial legislation); Holmes v. Government of the Virgin Is-
lands, 370 F. Supp. 715 (D. V .I. 1974) (the judicial branch may not encroach on or interfere 
with the proper exercise of the powers which have been lawfully delegated to the legisla-
tive branch); Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State 
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similar to the one in the Michigan Constitution, "[n]o person exer-
cising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belong-
ing to another branch, except as expressly provided in this con-
stitution." 1 03 
The line between permissible judicial interpretation and imper-
missible judicial legislation is acknowledged to be narrow. 104 But 
contrary to the traditional view, which sharply distinguished be-
tween the legislative and judicial functions, 105 the contemporary 
view is that the separation of powers doctrine is contravened only 
by the degree of involvement which one branch has in another 
branch's affairs,106 and is thus not to be regarded as an absolute 
prohibition on that involvement. 107 The separation of powers doc-
trine is viewed as a general principle applied to maintain checks 
and balances between the three governmental branches. 108 In 
slightly different terms, it is directed not at the danger of "blended 
v. O'Brien, 272 F. Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 1967) (courts may not control or supervise the oper-
ations of the other two branches of government). 
103 MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2. See also .Ai.A. CONST. art. 3, § 43; ARIZ. CONST. art. 3; 
ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. 3; CONN. CONST. art. 
2; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ,i 4; IDAHO CONST. art. 2, § 1; ILL. 
CONST. art. 2, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1; low A CONST. art 3, § 1; KY. CONST.§§ 27 & 28; 
LA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1 & 2; ME. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1 & 2; Mo. CONST. art. 8; MASS. 
CONST. pt. 1, art. 30; MINN. CONST. art. 3; Miss. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1 & 2; Mo .. CoNsT. art. 
2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. 4; NEB. CONST. art. 2; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1; N. C. CONST. 
art. 1, § 6; N. H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 37; N. J. CONST. art. 3; N. M. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OKLA. 
CONST. art. 4; ORE. CONST. art. 3, § 1; R. I. CoNST. art. 3; S. C. CONST. art 1, § 8; S. D. 
CONST. art. 2; TENN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1 & 2; TEX. CONST. art. 2, § l; UTAH CONST. art. 5, 
§ 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 5; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § l; WYO. CONST. 
art. 2, § I. The states whose constitutions do not contain a provision relating to the sep-
aration of powers are: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
10
• See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, 202 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (courts 
must be careful so as not to cross the "gossamer line which sometimes separates proper 
judicial interpretation from judicial usurpation of the legislative function"). 
1 os See note 57 supra. 
10• A. Cox, supra note 47, at 99. 
107 United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835,840 (S.D.N. Y. 1963). The court stated: 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in 1953 wrote: 
"The division of government into three branches does not imply, as its critics 
would have us think, three watertight compartments. Montesquieu, as we have 
seen, knew better; the three departments, he said, must move 'in concert.' " 
(Emphasis supplied) .... The isolation of these powers is not intended and any 
complete division between departments is impossible. 
(footnote omitted). 
1 0
• See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N .J. 133, 174, 351 A .2d 713, 735, cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975) (Mountain, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion with Justice 
Clifford, Justice Mountain stated: 
Clearly today the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot be said to require a 
complete compartmentalization along triadic lines. More and more courts have 
come to recognize that where a practical necessity exists, a blending of powers 
will be countenanced, but only so long as checks and balances are present to 
guard against abuses. 
Id. at 178, 351 A.2d at 737 (emphasis in original). 
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power" but at the danger of "unchecked power. " 109 
General standards which determine when one branch has im-
permissibly interfered with another branch's internal affairs have 
been established. For example, federal courts may not interfere 
with the management of the internal affairs of either house of Con-
gress, nor may they judge the qualifications of its members. 110 
Federal courts may not control or supervise the management or 
operations of departments or agencies of the executive branch. 111 
More generally, federal courts may not interfere with powers. that 
have been lawfully delegated to the legislature,1 12 nor may they 
supply missing portions of statutes which are under-inclusive in 
their scope. 113 Michigan state courts are guided by a separation of 
powers standard which displays the same spirit as the federal 
standards. While they may pass upon the constitutional validity of 
statutes and ordinances, Michigan state courts cannot compel 
legislative bodies to act in one way or another, as when they try to 
compel members of a city council to amend an ordinance .114 New 
Jersey state courts have a duty to say what the law is and not what 
they think it should be, as in the case of the legislature's failure to 
remove an unemancipated child's immunity from tort suit. 115 
These standards require courts to make judgments ·of degree. 
The question of degree can be analyzed into two separate ques-
tions: (1) How much should a court limit constitutional adjudica-
tion to cases and remedies which have traditionally been the prov-
ince of judicial determination or, how much should it expand judi-
cial intervention into the affairs of the other branches? (2) To what 
extent should a court's decisions and orders be guided by consid-
erations of policy taken independently of existing law, and to what 
extent by the law as it stands or by criteria and standards which a 
court considers binding even though it would reach another con-
clusion if it were not bound by the law? 116 
10 • K. DAVIS, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 1.09 at 68 (1958). See also Myers V. 
U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis, dissenting, stated: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted ... not to promote efficiency 
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid fric-
tion, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the gov-
ernmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 
110 Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. O'Brien, 
272 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D.D.C. 1967). 
111 Id. 
112 Holmes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 370 F. Supp. 715, 723 (D. V .I. 1974). 
113 Winningham v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 371 F. Supp. 1140, ll51 
(S. D. Ga. 1974), qffd, 512 F.2d 617 (5th. Cir. 1975). 
114 Randall v. Meridian Township Bd., 34i Mich. 605, 608, 70 N .W .2d 728, 729 (1955). 
11 • Bush v. Bush, 95 N. J. Super. 368,231 A.2d 245 (1967). 
116 A. Cox, supra note 47, at 99. In Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 
N.W.2d 72 (1978), Justice Ryan remarks: 
Our stated and restated deference to the legislative function, as embodied in the 
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2. Substance/Procedure Distinctions-If a court holds a stat-
utory scheme void as of the date of its opinion, no violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine is likely to be found, since it has lohg 
been accepted that it is within the judicial function to suggest ap-
proaches which would remedy constitutional deficiencies to the 
legislature and to retain jurisdiction to monitor the effect of any 
remedy given. 117 Unconstitutionality in futuro, in contrast, allows 
a court to consider independent policy factors and thus danger-
ously encroach on the provinces of the other branches through the 
interaction of the factors of delayed timing and suggested 
guidelines. 
In analyzing the appropriate use of unconstitutionality in futurn, 
one factor which arguably should influence the freedom with which 
a court may consider independent policy issues is whether the 
court is dealing with a procedural or substantive problem. Argu-
ably, the dangers inherent in holdings of unconstitutionality in fu-
turo may be greater when they are used to compel changes in sub-
stantively defective statutes than when they are used in an attempt 
to correct procedurally deficient statutes. In the former case, the 
court is more likely to intrude on the public policy and political 
sphere, which have traditionally been deemed within the province 
of the legislature. 118 When correcting procedural defects, the court 
familiar doctrine of presumptive constitutional validity, is no mere verbalism. Its 
source is the doctrine of separation of powers and its lifeblood is judicial self-
restraint. We are not free to strike down this revolutionary new concept of com-
pensation for motor vehicle caused injury and damage because we may think it to 
be unwise or even at odds with our personal notions of what is fair. We test for 
constitutional collision. If there is none, like it or not, we ought to decline to dis-
turb the legislative will. Stated otherwise, our review and judgment must be such 
as to not unduly hamper the Legislature's freedom to experiment and innovate 
by superimposing our judgment as to the expediency or wisdom of the legislation 
over theirs. This necessary policy of deference affords the Legislature ample 
scope for putting its prophesies to the test of proof. 
Id. at fi64-65, 267 N.W.2d at 118 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
117 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Freedman 
v. Maryland, 380 U.S.' 51 (1965); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
118 See Jaffe, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1112 (1963). See also San-
dalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1186-87 (1977). Professor 
Sandalow writes concerning the process by which legislation is legitimized through enact-
ment by Congress: 
That process confers legitimacy upon the decision not merely because it registers 
consent in some abstract way but, as I have urged elsewhere, because political re-
sponsibility is crucial to the democratic ideal that governmental policies ought to 
respond to the wishes of the citizenry ... First, it provides a means by which gov-
ernment is made more sensitive to the impact of a policy upon the various segments 
of the society and thereby contributes to the calculation of gains and losses result-
ing from that policy. Second, since an appraisal of the consequences of policy in-
volves not merely a measurement of gains and losses, but a judgment of what is to 
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is less likely to override policy decisions made by the legislature or 
the executive by instituting a court-generated rule which merely ef-
fectuates the goal of the substantive rule. 
It is a close question whether the Shavers court violated the sep-
aration of powers doctrine as it is presently conceived. The list of 
minimum due process guarantees which the court suggested fall 
within the area ofrecognizedjudicial competence and so the risk of 
the court imposing its own arbitrary and subjective policy g-0als in 
place of fully researched and debated legislative policy goals is 
small. Robinson, however, violates the separation of powers doc-
trine. In ordering that the funds for the 1976-77 school year be allo-
cated under an "incentive equalization aid formula" instead of the 
formula under existing statutes, the court arguably took for itself 
the power of appropriation, which the New Jersey Constitution 
places squarely in the hands of the state legislature .119 When the 
power to appropriate funds, which is constitutionally and tradi-
tionally a legislative power, is taken by a court, there is a much 
greater danger of judicial incompetence and hence arbitrariness 
than when a court, for example, sets minimum due process stan-
dards. There is far less assurance that the power to appropriate 
funds will be controlled or checked in the way that the separation 
of powers doctrine contemplates. This would indicate that there is 
less reason to object on separation of powers grounds to the use of 
unconstitutionality in futuro in a Shavers-type case than in a 
Robinson-type case. 
3. Judicial Responses-Unconstitutionality in futuro also raises 
separation of powers concerns since it creates an odd and disquiet-
ing amalgam of judicial restraint and activism, in which the court 
on the one hand defers to the legislative will but on the other 
strongly suggests the desired response. For example, the judicial 
approach to due process has traditionally been either to read due 
process requirements directly into the procedurally vague sta-
count as a gain or loss and how these shall be balanced, political responsibility 
helps ensure that governmental policy will not depart too far from the values of the 
citizenry. Finally, the political responsibility of the legislature creates an incentive 
for compromise and accommodation that facilitates developments of policies that 
maximize the satisfaction of constituents' desires. A consensus achieved through a 
broadly representative political process is, thus, as close as we are likely to get to 
the statement of a norm which can be said to reflect the values of the society. 
Id. at 1187 (citation omitted). 
119 The New Jersey Constitution requires the New Jersey Legislature to "provide for the 
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the 
instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N. J. 
CoNST. art. 8, § 4, 'ii I. 
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tute 1 20 or to strike the statute down immediately, 121 depending on 
the extent of its vagueness. But in Shavers, the court chose neither 
of these alternatives. Instead, it required legislative action to ac-
complish what it could have accomplished itself, though it left the 
legislature with a clear idea of what an acceptable solution would 
be. 
The same amalgam of judicial restraint and activism is present in 
the Robinson cases. In Robinson I the guidelines consisted of the 
mandate to define the state's obligation to provide a thorough and 
efficient system of free public schools. 122 The court presented the 
legislature with a choice between imposing a statewide property 
tax, in which case it must tax all the taxable property in the state, 
or assigning the taxing function to local government, in which case 
the tax must fall uniformly upon all taxable property within the 
county or municipality .1 23 Two years later, when Robinson was 
again before it, the New Jersey Supreme Court was reluctant to go 
further than the issuance of a provisional remedy for the 1976-77 
school year because "it would [have been] premature and inappro-
priate for the Court at the present posture of this complex matter to 
undertake, a priori, a comprehensive blueprint for 'thorough and 
efficient' education, and seek to impose it upon the other Branches 
of government." 124 Yet, in deciding to order that funds for the 
school year 1976-77 should not be disbursed as provided under 
then-existing statutes, the court characterized itself as "the desig-
nated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution's command." 125 
The Shavers and Robinson courts are engaging in both judicial 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I (1947), in which the Court held that 
the due process requirement is complied with by a statute whose language marks suffi-
ciently distinct boundaries for judges and juries to administer the law in accordance with 
the legislative will. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court, citing Pet-
rillo, remarked that if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is 
plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though margi-
nal cases could be imagined where doubts might arise. Id. at 618. For a recent example of 
a court's reading standards into a vague statute, see People v. Neumayer, No. 59093 
(Mich. Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, 1979), in which the court read into the Michigan criminal obscen-
ity statute, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 750.343a-.343b (1970), the standards announced by 
the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The court held 
that, as it stood, the Michigan criminal obscenity statute lacks the specificity required ofa 
statute which seeks to regulate speech or expression. 
121 See, e.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,287 (1961) (a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must guess at the meaning and differ as to its application violates the first es-
sential of due process); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
122 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297. 
123 Id. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288. 
124 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson JV), 69 N.J. at 144, 351 A.2d at 718. 
125 /d. at 154,351 A.2dat 724. 
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and legislative functions .126 Their judicial function consists in their 
ruling on the constitutionality of two statutory schemes. 127 They 
have also undertaken, through the use of delayed timing, suggested 
guidelines, and retention of jurisdiction, to define broad policy ob-
jections and to move the legislature to directed action. The pres-
ence of judicial activism and restraint in the same litigation pro-
duces a dynamic which alternately pushes the court ahead to pro-
vide temporary remedies and holds it back from fashioning a final 
solution. As the case is prolonged, however, the pressure on the 
court may force it to take drastic steps, such as the Robinson VI 
court took in issuing the injunction against further spending for 
public education.128 This dynamic inevitably prolongs the court's 
role in the litigation and may in the long run exacerbate the prob-
lem. In Robinson, what began as an exercise in extreme judicial re-
straint became in the end a clear example of judicial activism and 
an intrusion on the legislative function. Thus, the postponement of 
the effect of a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro will tend to 
produce an effect opposite to the one hoped for by the court. In-
stead of a legislature quickly acting to remedy a constitutionally de-
ficient statute or statutory scheme, it may fail altogether to act out 
of a "despairing willingness ... to dump its problems upon the 
court." 129 Furthermore, because the judicial exercise of the legis-
lative function is delayed and is conditioned upon the legislative or 
executive branch's failure to act, healthy criticism of the court's 
action is rendered premature and hence less effective. 
The problem of degree which inheres in the contemporary doc-
trine of the separation of powers is not confined to holdings of un-
constitutionality in futuro, but affects all judicial activity in the 
realm of public law litigation. Whenever statutory schemes of great 
social importance come before a court novel remedies are called 
for, some of which may unavoidably require the judicial branch to 
perform functions which belong to the other branches. ·This is 
especially true if, as occurred in Brown and Robinson, and as yet 
may occur in Shavers, the legislature refuses to comply with judi-
126 /d. at 154-55, 351 A.2d at TI4. The court stated: 
This Court, as the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution's command, 
possesses and must use power equal to its responsibility. Sometimes, unavoidably 
incident thereto and in response to a constitutional mandate, the Court must act, 
even in a sense seem to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches of 
government. And while the court does so, when it must, with restraint and even 
reluctance, there comes a time when no alternative remains. That time has now 
arrived. 
(citation omitted). 
127 But see note 69 and accompanying text supra. 
128 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). 
12• A. Cox, supra note 47, at 95. 
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cially suggested guidelines. The question whether the judiciary has 
an affirmative duty to compel compliance by the other branches 
when it determines that the Constitution demands it has been 
called "the next great challenge of American con-
stitutionalism." 130 It often happens that the choice is between the 
court doing the bestjob it can and no one doing it at all. 131 Courts 
have already been forced to choose between permitting an uncon-
stitutional scheme to continue and acting themselves to remedy the 
sittiation. 132 Such acts should not be undertaken lightly, however, 
130 Id. at 98. 
131 Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism 
or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. I, 5-6 (1968). 
132 For an example of when it was deemed necessary and proper for a court to so act, 
see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In affirming the district court's order for tem-
porary reapportionment of the Alabama Legislature for the 1962 general election, the 
Court stated that the district court had "acted wisely in declining to stay the impending 
primary election ... and properly refrained from acting further until the Alabama Legis-
lature had been given the opportunity to remedy the admitted discrepancies in the State's 
legislative apportionment scheme, while initially stating some of its views to provide 
guidelines for legislative action." Id. at 586. The Court remanded the case to the district 
court "[s]ince the District Court evinced its realization that its ordered reapportionment 
could not be sustained as the basis for conducting the 1966 election of Alabama legis-
lators, and avowedly intends to take some further action should the reapportioned 
Alabama Legislature fail to enact a constitutionally valid, permanent apportionment 
scheme in the interim ... . "Id.at 587. Reynolds clearly shares many features in common 
with holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro. The main difference is that the district court 
did not postpone the effect of its holding to a future date. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 
(M.D. Ala. 1962) (the district court decisions in the Reynolds controversy are reported 
sub nom. Sims v. Frink). The Supreme Court stated, in effect, that this was a case in 
which the judiciary had to act: "No effective political remedy to obtain relief against the 
alleged malapportionment of the Alabama Legislature appears to have been available. No 
initiative procedure exists under Alabama law." 377 U.S. at 553 (footnote omitted). 
For a recent Supreme Court decision which provided a solution similar to the one pro-
vided in Reynolds, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976). Buckley was an action against 
the Federal Election Commission and various government officials which challenged cer-
tain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. §§431-455, 18 
U .S.C. §§ 591-607) and the provisions of Subtitle Hof the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 
(I.R.C. §§ 9031-9042) for public financing of Presidential election campaigns. The plain-
tiffs also contended that the method of appointment of members of the Federal Election 
Commission violated the principle of the separation of powers. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(I) pro-
vides that two of the six voting members are to be appointed by the President pro tempore 
of the Senate, two are to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, and two are to be 
appointed by the President, with all six members being subject to confirmation by the 
majority ofboth Houses. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held, inter alia, that the 
method of appointment of the members of the Federal Election Commission violated the 
principle of separation of powers insofar as the Commission performed rulemaking, ad-
judicatory, and enforcement powers under the statutes, although the Commission, as it 
was then constituted, could properly exercise investigative powers. But in fashioning a 
remedy, the Court stated: 
It is also our view that the Commission's inability to exercise certain powers be-
cause of the method by which its members have been selected should not affect 
the validity of the Commission's administration of those provisions, upheld to-
day, authorizing the public financing of federal elections. The past acts of the 
Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity, just as we have recognized 
should be the case with respect to legislative acts performed by legislators held to 
have been elected in accordance with an unconstitutional apportionment plan. 
We also draw on the Court's practice in the apportionment and voting rights 
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for each bold decision brings the court into the political arena, 
where its legitimacy can be questioned. 133 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unconstitutionality in futuro is likely to present the problem of 
judicial encroachment on the functions of the other two branches 
and the dilemma between judicial restraint and activism in every 
case in which it is employed. Because of its three features of the 
delayed effect of the holding, suggested guidelines, and retained 
jurisdiction, it is an attractive remedy and has the unique capability 
to ensure that courts will undertake the challenge to do what no 
one else will do. But because of thejudiciary's demonstrated lack 
of competence in overseeing long-term remedies and in setting 
adequate standards for and limits on further intervention, uncon-
stitutionality in futuro also ensures that this task will most often be 
done poorly. 
The short-term difficulties which accompany holdings of uncon-
stitutionality in futuro, and which were highlighted in Robinson, 
certainly deserve close scrutiny. But even more important are the 
long-term adverse effects, the erosion in a court's legitimacy and 
its effectiveness, which a court risks if it employs unconstitutional-
ity in futuro without first measuring the demands of the specific 
situation against a set of established judicial standards and consid..: 
ering the utility of other less drastic solutions. 
-Philip H. Hecht 
cases and stay, for a period not to exceed 30 days, the Court's judgment insofar 
as it affects the authority of the Commission to exercise the duties and powers 
granted to it under the Act. This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity 
to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement 
mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the Court sus-
tains, allowing the present Commission in the interim to function de facto in ac-
cordance with the substantive provisions of the Act. 
Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted). 
133 Jaffe, supra note Il8, at 1112. 
